



УДК 329.05 (477) "1990/2014"

REGIONAL CLEAVAGES OF THE ELECTORAL FIELD OF UKRAINE AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE CONFIGURATION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM IN 1990–2014

Gudz VV,

Postgraduate studies Sofia University

St. Kliment Ohridski, Bulgaria, 1504 Sofia, blvd. Tsar Liberator 15

Abstract. The author has studied the features of regional cleavages in Ukraine, which affect the electoral preferences of the population of the regions and the configuration of the party system. The study of electoral cycles and the results of parliamentary elections of 1990–2014 led to the conclusion that the regional identity of citizens at the geographical poles of East–West and the corresponding electoral preferences at all stages of the evolution of the electoral space are stable. It was found that the ideological differences between the Southeast and the West (with Kyiv), which were observed in the 1990s, finally gave way to socio-cultural and geopolitical divisions after the Orange Revolution, when the electorate of the communists supported the pro-Russian presidential candidate V. Yanukovych. It was revealed, firstly, that in Ukraine, regional cleavages East–West have historically developed, with a nuclear electorate at the poles in Galicia and Donbas with Crimea, the population of which differs, first of all, in ethnocultural self-identification and geopolitical orientation. Secondly, the boundaries of the population's electoral preferences were mobile, but under no circumstances did the left and pro-Russian forces win in Galicia, and the national democrats - in Crimea and Donbas. Thirdly, the parliamentary composition and the general configuration of political forces were influenced by various factors, but the political preferences of the electorate of the pole regions of the South-East and West were a significant and stable factor in the structuring of the party system. In general, the electoral field and the corresponding political palette of parliamentary parties clearly reflect the regional cleavages existing in society, associated with the national composition of the regions, their geopolitical neighborhood, and the mentality of the population. Despite the depth of the regional cleavages, the West and the South-East and the mistakes of the authorities, they were balanced by the Center and did not threaten the integrity of Ukraine. The main reason for separatism in Crimea and separatism in Crimea in the Donbas in 2014 was Russia, which eventually moved to direct armed invasion.

Keywords: Ukraine, regional cleavages, electoral field, electoral cycles 1990–2014, parliamentary elections, party system.

Introduction.

Political parties in modern states, including post-Soviet ones, continue to be one of the main actors in politics, and thus a factor in the development of society. The society determines its political preferences through elections, the outcome of which often depends on the established moods of the electorate in a particular region rather than on the effectiveness of the elected party. Regional cleavages influence the configuration of the party system and, as the experience of Ukraine has shown, the overall security of the state through self-identification, political culture and electoral



behavior of the local population. This raises the issue of studying regional socio-cultural peculiarities and the corresponding electoral differentiation of the territory of Ukraine to take it into account in the development of state strategy and regional policy.

The study of the impact of socio-political cleavages (divisions) on the process of political party formation and the development of party systems in post-industrial societies was initiated by S. Lipset and S. Roccan (USA), who identified 4 types of cleavages [1]. Further development of the concept of regional cleavages, in particular, in relation to transitional societies, to which Ukraine belongs, was carried out by G. Kitchelt [2], A. Römmele [3], M. Lyubenov [4] and others. The author also takes into account S. Huntington's thesis that in Ukraine, it is not the ideological or economic differences of the regions that are more important, but the “split” between the Western Catholic-Protestant and Eastern Byzantine-Orthodox civilizations [5, p. 255-257]. According to R. Manailo-Prykhodko and Y. Ostapets: “This “split” of the Ukrainian society has a decisive influence on the electoral processes and processes of regional party formation” [6, p. 10].

The problem of regional divisions in Ukraine and their impact on the behavior of the electorate and the party system has also attracted the attention of many other domestic scholars, including authors of monographs [7; 8], dissertations [9; 10; 11] and articles, including the author of the current study [12; 13; 14]. However, the gradual evolution of the electoral space in 1990-2014 with its regional extrapolation to the party races of the parliamentary elections requires a special study.

Main text.

The purpose of the study is to determine the degree of influence of regional distinctions on the electoral choice and party system of Ukraine.

To study the regional peculiarities of political consciousness and electoral preferences, the results of national monitoring studies conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and other research centers were taken and correlated and supplemented by certain features. On the basis of these data, the most stable division of Ukraine into two super-regions - West and East - with the Center being closer to the former and the Southern region to the latter was



identified.

The basis of the Euro-Atlantic-oriented electorate and the national political spectrum is traditionally the Western region, which has demonstrated the greatest political activity of voters, their patriotism and nationalism. Even during the Soviet referendum in March 1991. Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk regions included in its text and supported the provision on Ukraine's independence, while the rest of Ukraine was offered a renewed USSR or support for the 1990 Declaration of Independence. Ukrainian national traditions, ethnic composition, and even the very territorial proximity to democratic European states are regional factors that have left their mark on the worldview of Western Ukrainians, giving it a right-wing, national-democratic, and Euro-Atlantic spectrum and corresponding party preferences.

The left sector of the political component in the Ukrainian parliament has long been represented by socialists and communists with their reliance on the southeastern regions, the majority of whose population voted for integration with Russia, the state status of the Russian language, social equality, condemnation of NATO and nationalists, “Banderites,” etc. The regional cleavage between the conventional West and East reached its peak during the Orange and Dignity revolutions, which was reflected in the electoral choice and party structure of the state.

As indicators of the influence of regional cliques on the electoral behavior of the population, we have taken the results of parliamentary elections (1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2012, 2014) and partially the presidential election cycles of 1991, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2010, 2014, which also affected the structure of the party system. The analysis of the content of national election campaigns allowed us to identify conditional stages of formation of the electoral map of Ukraine: 1) the first half of the 1990s; 2) the second half of the 1990s - early 2000; 3) mid-2000 - 2013; 4) early 2014.

The first half of the 1990s was marked by the initial stage of regional differentiation of the electoral space. During this period, the contours of the key axis of confrontation between the “pro-Westerners”, supporters of full independence and European integration, and the “Eurasians”, who advocated deepening ties with Russia and other countries of the Union of Independent States, gradually emerged.



The starting point for analyzing the formation of the party system is the legalization in 1990 of the first non-communist political party in the Ukrainian SSR, the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP). However, the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of the first convocation took place before its registration on March 30, 1990. Therefore, the structuring of the deputy corps, which according to the law consisted of 450 people, took place directly in the course of the Parliament's activities. For the first time, the forces opposed to the Communist Party (the Democratic Bloc) won in 5 regions (Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Volyn, and Kyiv) and received 111 out of 442 seats. A division was formed along the lines of “left-wing - not left-wing political forces”: the pro-communist “Group 239”, which formed the majority, and the national-democratic “People's Council”. After the referendum on independence on December 1, 1991, the Verkhovna Rada was not dissolved, allowing the old establishment to remain in power. Initially, 85% of the MPs were members of the Communist Party, but most of them later left the party, wanting to retain their former privileges [9, p.106-107].

In the first presidential elections of 1991, out of seven candidates, three represented legalized parties (L. Lukyanenko - URP; L. Taburyansky - NPU) or public associations that later became parties (V. Chornovil - NRU). The results of the first presidential election reflected the Soviet mentality of the electorate, 61% of which voted for the former Communist Party ideologue Leonid Kravchuk. At this stage, regional cleavage was manifested only on the border with Western Ukraine, where the National Democratic Party's representative Vyacheslav Chornovil won in three regions [6, p. 152].

Initially (before the 1994 elections), parties were created mainly from below, as a form of civic initiatives, and usually had distinct ideological foundations. Later, with the gradual loss of the Communist Party's position, these principles became irrelevant. At the same time, there were first cases of creation of parties by representatives of business structures (in particular, the TKU, PNERU, LPU). In 1994, the first of the most successful (for a certain period of time) business project parties, the All-Ukrainian Union “Hromada” (P. Lazarenko), was legalized. Centrist parties were formed as representatives of the main political ideologies (Social Democrats, Greens, Liberals)



or as “general democratic” parties (the PvdA).

A large group was made up of right-wing (including right-wing radical) and center-right (national democratic) parties: URP, NRU, KUN, UNCP, DemPU. The left flank was represented by parties that emerged on the basis of the Communist Party of Ukraine, banned in 1991. Communist Party (SPU, SelPU), as well as small left-wing radical and “reintegration” groups.

In 1993, the two most influential parties of the time, the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), which was lifted from the ban, and the People's Movement of Ukraine (PMU), which was constituted from a public organization, were legalized.

The 1994 presidential election was the first to clearly demonstrate the social divisions in Ukrainian society between the electorates of Leonid Kuchma and Leonid Kravchuk, respectively. Leonid Kuchma's statement on the introduction of Russian as the second state language, his loyalty to Russia, and his Dnipro (eastern) origin, in contrast to Leonid Kravchuk's western Ukrainian origin and national orientation, clearly demonstrated regional cleavages. Ukrainian-speaking regions of the Center and West and believers of the UOC-KP and UGCC supported the current president. Mr. Kravchuk received the largest number of votes (over 90%) in the three Galician regions that voted against him in 1991. The densely populated regions of the industrialized Southeast, oriented toward Russia, the Communists, and the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate, elected their protege, Leonid Kuchma.

The majoritarian system of the 1994 parliamentary elections created certain institutional obstacles to filling the parliament and its party and ideological structuring. Despite the significant electoral success of non-party candidates, the 1994 elections showed that candidates from left-wing political forces relied on the support of voters in the East, South and rural regions of the Center (SPU), while in the Western region candidates from right-wing and center-right parties gained an advantage. According to the election results, 14 parties were represented in the Parliament [6, p.155-159].

The revived Communist Party became the largest party in the Verkhovna Rada with 84 seats, or 25%, while the SPU took only 14 seats. Together, the left-wing parties won 35% of the seats, thus forming a blocking minority. It was a kind of protest of the



masses against catastrophic failures in the economy, delays in pensions and wages, hyperinflation, and separation from Russia, which caused nostalgia for the stable Soviet times. As M. Mycio noted, “Ukrainian voters will choose between the East and the West.” At the same time, the journalist cited the opinion of Jan Brzezinski, an advisor to the Verkhovna Rada: “Eastern Ukraine is the last bastion of homo sovieticus. Their main concern is personal well-being” [15].

The 1994 elections confirmed that the main social divide of the first stage of electoral transformation was the communist/democratic divide, which was characteristic of the transition period. The configuration of the party system generally corresponded to this division. There were 15 most active political parties (multi-party system). The main poles of the party system were the left (CPU, SPU, SelPU, SDPU) and the right (NRU, URP, KUN, UKRP, CDU, UNA), respectively, and the main line of division was the confrontation between the left and national democratic parties. The main anti-system party was the Communist Party of Ukraine. The center parties formed at this stage were significantly inferior in weight to the flank parties. The regional division of the parties was already evident, as they had different socio-political and regional bases despite their all-Ukrainian status. The Communists relied mainly on the electorate of the Southeast. The Peasant Party and the Socialists shared influence among the peasantry of Central and Left-Bank Ukraine. The People's Movement had the greatest support in the West and Center of Ukraine and shared the electorate with the URP and the KUN, with its support in the West.

At the same time, the beginning of the first stage was characterized by a skeptical attitude of the majority of citizens towards political trends. In particular, 33.4% of respondents did not define their position, 25.6% did not support any of them [16, p. 10].

The general trend of the first half of the 1990s was the simultaneous expansion of the electoral base of political antipodes - the National Democrats led by the NRU, and even more so of the left-wing structures of the CPU and the SPU, which correlates with regional polarization East-West.

The second stage of territorial differentiation of the electoral space covers the



second half of the 1990s - early 2000s. Two axes of differentiation dominated: geopolitical (pro-Western vs. pro-Russian) and ideological (left vs. nonleft), around which citizens voted in the 1998, 1999, and 2002 elections.

The analysis of the results of citizens' electoral orientations in the first decade of Ukraine's independence shows that Western voters mostly shared national democratic values (NRU, KUN, URP). At the same time, the ideas of national radicals showed a tendency to weaken their influence on voters. The majority of the population in the South and East supported left-wing political forces - the CPU, the PSPU, the SPU, and the SelPU. The centrists - For United Ukraine, SDPU(u), PDP, DemPU - relied on the least structured and volatile electorate in all regions and administrative resources [17, p. 57].

With the introduction of party lists in the 1998 parliamentary elections, regional peculiarities of voting behavior became more pronounced. The Communists (24.6% of the vote), the NRU (9.4%), and the SPU-Selpu bloc (8.6%) took the top three places in the country according to party lists. The opposition mood of citizens led to the victory of political forces that opposed the government from different parts of the ideological spectrum.

The results of the 1998 elections confirmed the almost diametrically opposed electoral positions of the parties in the East-West context. Right-oriented political forces won only in 5 western regions of Galicia and Volyn and in Kyiv. The Communists and Socialists expanded their electoral space to the Right Bank of Ukraine and gained a majority in the Verkhovna Rada, creating a threat of “red revenge” and joining the alliance with Russia and Belarus. As M. Vines pointed out: “All the attributes of Western democracy are in place. ... But too often it is a shell hiding a Eurasian core” [18].

To retain power, the current head of state, Leonid Kuchma, in the 1999 presidential election, electorally relied not only on the East, but also on the West and Center of Ukraine, which brought him victory. The western national-patriotic pole (Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil regions), fearing the communist leader P. Symonenko, gave 90% of their votes to the “lesser evil” Leonid Kuchma with more



than 90% of the vote, while in 1994 the same number voted against him as “pro-Russian”.

The electorate of the South and East was divided in support of Kuchma and Symonenko approximately equally, and in most regions of the Center, except Kyiv, the Communist Party leader won. The support of the Communists' rhetoric by the electorate of the central regions (“red belt” in 1999), a significant part of which was made up of peasants, was due to socio-economic problems and nostalgia for the USSR. The National Democrats were forced to form an alliance with the center-left to prevent the left from coming to power.

In the 2002 parliamentary elections, the ideological axis of the left-right confrontation weakened, as integrating blocs emerged in the centrist and national democratic spectrums, claiming to dominate Ukrainian politics. For example, in the East, some voters supported the ruling bloc “For United Ukraine!” or the “party of power” led by the head of the presidential administration, V. Lytvyn, which came third in the parliamentary race (12%) and also added majority members to its faction in the Verkhovna Rada.

The southern and eastern regions, as well as some peasants in the Center, favored the CPU and the SPU, choosing the “reintegration” direction. The victory of the National Democratic Bloc “Our Ukraine” led by Viktor Yushchenko was secured by voters in the West and parts of the Center, including Kyiv. “Our Ukraine” and Yulia Tymoshenko's Bloc (Yulia Tymoshenko's Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc) ran on slogans of support for Euro-Atlantic integration, statehood of the Ukrainian language, rehabilitation of UPA soldiers, withdrawal of the Russian fleet from Sevastopol, support for small and medium-sized businesses, etc.

These were the slogans with which the Democrats and their leader, Viktor Yushchenko, ran for office during the Orange Revolution of 2004. In the second round of the presidential election, they were again supported by 16 of the 25 regions of the republic and the city of Kyiv. Left-wing, pro-Russian and oligarchic forces, represented primarily by the Party of Regions and its candidate, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, found support mainly in the South-East [14, p. 67].



The 2004 elections marked the beginning of the third stage of regional differentiation of Ukraine's electoral space, which lasted until the early elections of 2014. During this period, the classical geopolitical axis of electoral identification “West-Russia” remained in place. The ideological confrontation “left-right” was replaced by a struggle between the orange (national democrats) and the white and blue (Eurasians, regionals). Ideological differences became clearly tied to regional identity, which contributed to the strengthening of the territorial division between the West and the East [17, p. 55]. The elections recorded the classic regional division of the electoral map of Ukraine: the ruling candidate Viktor Yanukovych won in 9 regions in the East and South of the country, while the opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko won a majority in the Western and Central regions.

The radical politicization of regional identity issues during the three-round presidential election campaign of 2004-2005 of the Orange Revolution allowed for the speculative use of regional differences in statements about the political split of Ukraine. Russian political technologists and oligarchic media invited by the authorities played a major role in deepening the West-East regional cleavage, constructing the idea of “two Ukraine's” by intimidating the East and South with “Banderites” and “fascists” who encroached on the Russian language, Soviet values, and friendship with Russia [19].

The duration of the third stage of differentiation of the electoral field is indicated by the fact that the regional boundaries of support for the two groups of political forces - “orange” and “white-blue” (and their candidates), which crystallized in the 2004 presidential election, were almost mirrored in the parliamentary elections of 2006, 2007, 2012 and the presidential election of 2010.

This trend was also evident in the parliamentary elections of March 27, 2006. Five political parties and blocs passed the electoral threshold: The Party of Regions, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYUT), the Our Ukraine bloc, the Union of Socialists, and the Communist Party. The early parliamentary elections of September 30, 2007 demonstrated similar colors of the party spectrum, except that the centrist Lytvyn Bloc replaced the SPU, which was compromised by its shift from an alliance with the



national democratic camp to the Party of Regions.

The Party of Regions, whose cradle was Donbas, took a more centrist position, combining its interests of big business with pro-Russian slogans, and won in 8 southeastern regions and in the Crimean Autonomy with Sevastopol. On the other hand, the absolute majority was won by the Orange Party in Volyn, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil regions, where over 90% of the population is ethnic Ukrainian. The left-wing forces with their traditional demands were supported mainly in the southeastern regions of the republic and some agricultural regions.

As the analysis of the differentiation of the party ideological spectrum in 1998-2007 shows, during this period, social and class values took a back seat to orientation toward Russian-speaking identity and Eurasian integration in the majority of the electorate in the Southeast. This was influenced by objective factors of market economy development, as well as political technologies and orientation toward their own republican leader, for which role Leonid Kuchma nominated Viktor Yanukovych, a native of Donetsk region, in 2002.

The 2010 presidential election, which ended with Yanukovych's victory over Yulia Tymoshenko, demonstrated the preservation of regional cleavages along the West-Center-Southeast line and the partial spread of the influence of the “Donetsk” ruling party to Transcarpathia. As of May 2010, the majority of voters showed support for the “reintegration” (16.3%) and national-democratic (13.2%) directions, the total share of supporters of the left and center-left directions was 10.2%. [20, c. 17]. This trend was consolidated by the parliamentary elections of 2012, which ended with the victory of the oligarchic Party of Regions over the demoralized National Democrats. The phenomena analyzed are typical for the entire period of evolution of the electoral space of post-communist Ukraine, the fourth stage of which began in the extreme conditions of 2014.

However, after the occupation of Crimea and part of Donbas by Russia in 2014, the national-democratic and Euro-Atlantic direction became stable and dominant in Ukrainian political culture. The presidential election was won by Petro Poroshenko, a representative of this direction, in the first round. Accordingly, the parliamentary



elections were a clear reflection of the shift of the main regional cleavage far to the east of the republic. “The “Opposition Bloc” of former Party of Regions members and their allies won a relative victory in only five regions of the East.

The manifestations of classical geographical factors (the effect of “friends and neighbors”, problematic voting, etc.), studies of the geography of representation on the example of Kharkiv, Donetsk, Zakarpattia and Galicia, and other regions, record the uneven interests and electoral behavior of representatives of even neighboring regions, which indicates the emergence of each region's own political process and its own political culture [21, p. 10].

The existence of different political preferences of regional communities in Ukraine, which is confirmed by the results of voting in parliamentary and presidential elections, is combined with the dominance of a single passive democratic type of mass political culture. A certain exception is the western macro-region. Thus, as O. Stegnyi argued, first, differences in electoral preferences do not divide regional communities of Ukraine on the basis of their attitude to democratic values; and second, support for democratic values is passive for the vast majority of Ukrainian citizens [22, p. 43]. This conclusion indicates the underdevelopment of civil society in Ukraine, which objectively created socio-political preconditions for the prolongation of authoritarian forms of state governance until the next revolutionary upsurge.

Moreover, as the experience of the parliamentary elections has shown, party socialization (influence on political culture) in Ukraine served rather to divide, as political parties, trying to gain voter support, speculatively appealed to different ideological orientations and socio-cultural differences of the population of the regions. In addition, with few exceptions, the parties remain small, clientelistic, and leadership-driven, which has not contributed to their credibility.

Even in 2004, 42.6% of Ukrainian citizens believed that Ukraine did not need a multi-party system. Membership in a party, even by a minor social stratum, is perceived without necessarily being immersed in the affairs of the party. During 1994-2004, about 83.8% of Ukrainian citizens did not belong to any public or political organizations or movements [23, p. 13].



Conclusions.

Thus, the results of election campaigns in Ukraine demonstrate the stability of significant regional differentiation of citizens and corresponding electoral preferences on the East-West poles at all stages of the evolution of the electoral space. The following lines of division are distinguished: right-left division, based primarily on attitudes toward the role of the state in the economy, the amount of taxes and social programs; attitudes toward market transformations and the degree of state regulation; civilizational division (attitudes toward the status of the Russian language and the church, the value of historical memory); geopolitical division (foreign policy orientation toward the West or Russia and the CIS; Ukraine's accession to NATO, etc.). Ideological differences finally gave way to socio-cultural and geopolitical ones after the Orange Revolution, when the electorate of the left-wing forces mostly sided with the pro-Russian presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovich. Ethno-cultural identity and perceptions of the geopolitical future of their country proved to be the most stable indicators of electoral differentiation mainly at the poles of the East (partly with the South) - West (with Kyiv, but without specific Transcarpathia) axis.

An analysis of the differentiation of Ukraine's electoral space shows that in the first alternative parliamentary elections, the regional division was along the lines of Western Ukraine (with Kyiv region) - Greater Ukraine. In the second elections of 1994, which were held under the majority system, 15 political forces were elected to the VRU, but most MPs were non-partisan, which makes it difficult to determine the demarcation line between the electoral fields. However, the political forces in the VRU were dominated by the left-wing parties with an electoral base in the Southeast. The 1998 elections saw a revenge of the leftist parties oriented toward Russia. The Communist Party won in 16 regions (even in Kyiv), pushing the NRU's electoral base to the borders of Galicia and Volyn. Instead, in the 2002 elections, after the victory of Leonid Kuchma in 1999 and the success of his government led by Viktor Yushchenko, the national democratic forces triumphed, pushing the "red" border of electoral priorities as far as Kharkiv, Poltava, and Kirovohrad regions. In the subsequent parliamentary elections of 2006 and 2007 (early), the Orange Party won in Poltava and



Kirovohrad, which clearly reflected the boundary of the eastern regional cleavage consisting of 8 regions and Crimea. Despite the subsequent presidency of Viktor Yanukovich, his Party of Regions lost to the national-democratic forces outside the Southeast (except for Zakarpattia), which proved the stability of regional cleavages. The Revolution of Dignity and the Russian invasion of 2014 were events that pushed the boundaries of the electoral division to the East, to the unoccupied areas of Luhansk and Donetsk regions and the adjacent Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhia regions. As a result of the 2014 campaign, for the first time in its history, the state gained a truly Ukrainian parliament, and the Opposition Bloc (formerly the Party of Regions) had only 27 deputies on its list.

Thus, according to the data of the 1990-2014 parliamentary elections, it has been established, first, that Ukraine has historically developed regional cliques South-East-West, with a nuclear electorate at the poles in Galicia and Donbas with Crimea, whose population differs primarily in ethno-cultural self-identification and geopolitical orientation. Secondly, the boundaries of electoral preferences in terms of left-right and pro-Russian-pro-European were fluid, but under no circumstances did left-wing and pro-Russian forces win in Galicia, and national democrats won in Crimea and Donbas. Third, the parliamentary composition and overall configuration of political forces were influenced by many factors (socio-economic situation, election laws, administrative resources, revolutionary and military events, etc.), but the electoral behavior of the population of the pole regions of the Southeast and West was a significant and stable factor in structuring the party system.

The regional character of political parties in modern Ukraine remained one of the main problems in their development. As the analysis of the results of the Verkhovna Rada elections shows, there was a discrepancy between the formal national status of political parties in Ukraine and their real electorate, which was limited to certain regions. These peculiarities of Ukraine do not deny the fact that in general, the electoral field and the corresponding political palette of parliamentary parties clearly reflected the regional cleavages that existed in society, which are related to both the national composition and mentality of the population of the regions and their geopolitical



neighborhood. Despite the depth of regional cleavages in the West and Southeast and the mistakes of the authorities, they were balanced by the Center and did not threaten the integrity of Ukraine. Behind the attempts of some regional leaders, such as Yanukovych or the Crimean “president” of Crimea, Yuriy Meshkov, to undermine the political situation was Russia, which eventually moved to direct invasion.

For the leadership and society of modern Ukraine, even in the critical conditions of martial law, and even more so in the future, it is important to take into account territorial features when building a stable party system and developing the state's regional policy aimed at integrating and consolidating the Ukrainian nation.

References

1. Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, S. Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments, in Lipset, Seymour Martin & Rokkan, Stein (eds), Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives. New York, Free Press, 1967, pp.1–64.
2. Kitschelt, H. Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions. In Party politics, 1995, Vol. 1, N. 4, pp. 447–472.
3. Rëmmele A. Struktura razmezhevanyya y partyynye systemy v Vostochnoy y Tsentral'noy Evrope. Polytycheskaya nauka. 2004. № 4. S. 30–51.
4. Lyubenov, M. Klyvydzhy y partyyny systemy. B"lharska polytolohyya pred predyzvykatelstvata na vremeto. Red. Mylen Lyubenov. Sofyya: Unyv. yzd. „Sv. Klyment Okhrydsky“, 2010. S. 247–265.
5. Hantinhton, S. Protystoyannya tsyvilizatsiy ta zmina svitovoho porjadku / pereklad z anhl. Klymonchuk, N.. L'viv: Kal'variya, 2006, 474 s.
6. Manaylo-Prykhod'ko R.YU., Ostapets' YU. Rehional'nyy vymir rozvytku ta funktsionuvannya partiynoyi systemy Ukrayiny. Monohrafiya. Uzhhorod: Vyd-vo "RIK-U", 2020. 388 s.
7. Etnopolitychni protsesy v Ukrayini: rehional'ni osoblyvosti: Monohrafiya / Red. kolehiya: YU.Levenets' (holova), M.Panchuk V.Voynalovych, V.Kotyhorenko ta in. Kyiv: IPEND im. I.F.Kurasa NAN Ukrayiny, 2011. 396s.
8. Rehional'nyy vymir suspil'no-politychnykh protsesiv v Ukrayini. Ukrayins'kyy



sotsium. Red. V.S. Krysachenko. Kyyiv: Znannya Ukrayiny, 2005. 792 s.

9. Manaylo-Prykhod'ko R. Rehional'nyy vymir rozvytku ta funktsionuvannya partiynoyi systemy Ukrayiny: dys... kand. polit. nauk: 23.00.02. L'viv, 2018. 292 s.

10. Sereda V. Rehional'ni osoblyvosti istorychnykh identychnostey ta yikh vplyv na formuvannya suchasnykh politychnykh oriyentatsiy v Ukrayini: avtoref. dys. na zdobuttya nauk. stupenya ... kand. sotsiol. nauk. Kyyiv, 2006. 20 s.

11. Cherkashyn K.V. Elektoral'na povedinka naselennya nezalezhnoyi Ukrayiny v rehional'nykh zrizakh: avtoref. dys... kand. polit. nauk: 23.00.02 Simferopol', 2005. 19 s.

12. Hudz' V. Osoblyvosti rehional'nykh klividzhiv Ukrayiny i yikh vplyv na suchasni parlament's'ki partiyyi. Materiały VII Międzynarodowej naukowii-praktycznej konferencji "Wykształcenie i nauka bez granic - 2011". 07-15 grudnia 2011 r. Vol. 15. Historia. Politologia. Panstwowy zarząd. Przemysł: Nauka i studia, 2011. S. 53-60.

13. Hudz' V.V. Etnorehional'ni klividzhi u suchasniy Ukrayini: prychny poyavy i shlyakhy podolannya. Ukrayinoznachchy al'manakh. Vypusk 13. Kyyiv, Melitopol': MDPU im. B.Khmel'nyts'koho, 2013. S. 52-60.

14. Gudz' V.V. Osoblyvosti rehional'nykh klividzhiv Ukrayiny ta yikh vplyv na partiynu systemu. Science and Education a New Dimension. Humanities and Social Sciences, VIII(40), I.: 232, 2020 June. www.seanewdim.com

15. Mycio Mary. Ukraine Voters to Choose Between East and West: Elections: President's main rival blames fiscal woes on Soviet breakup. He urges renewed ties with Russia. June 22, 1994 <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-06-22-mn-7136-story.html>

16. Holovakha, YE., Panina, N. Ukrayins'ke suspil'stvo 1992-2008: Sotsiolohichnyy monitorynh. Kyyiv, 2008. 85 s.

17. Klyuchkovych A. Elektoral'ne strukturuvannya terytoriyi Ukrayiny: osnovni rehiony, faktory ta etapy. Naukovyy visnyk Uzhhorods'koho universytetu: Seriya: Politolohiya. Sotsiolohiya. Filosofiya. Uzhhorod: Hoverla, 2014. Vyp. 17. S. 50–59.

18. Wines Michael. Struggling Ukraine Teeters Between East and West - The New York Times. Feb. 26, 1999



<https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/26/world/struggling-ukraine-teeters-between-east-and-west.html>

19. Aslund A., McFaul M. Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough. Washington: Book March 1, 2006. viii, 216 p.

20. Partiyna systema Ukrayiny: osoblyvosti stanovlennya, problemy funktsionuvannya, tendentsiyi evolyutsiyi. Tsentr Razumkova. Natsional'na bezpeka i oborona. №5. 2010. 84 s.

21. Kucherenko T. V. Rehional'nyy faktor u politychnomu protsesi Ukrayiny: avtoref. dys. ... kand. polit. nauk: 23.00.02. Kyyiv, 2002, 18 s.

22. Stehniy O.H. Typy politychnoyi kul'tury rehional'nykh spil'not Ukrayiny. Visnyk L'vivs'koho universytetu: seriya sotsiolohiya, 2008, Vyp. 2, s. 32–56.

23. Ukrayins'ke suspil'stvo 1994–2004: sotsiolohichnyy monitorynh. Za red. N. Paninoyi. Instytut sotsiolohiyi NAN Ukrayiny, TOV „Sotsis” - Tsentr sotsial'nykh i politychnykh doslidzhen', Fond „Demokratychni initsiatyvy”. Kyyiv, 2004. 64 s.